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U.N. Peace Operations Reform"At
present it is as if when a fire breaks out, we must first build a
fire station to respond. Rapid deployment can prevent enormous
agony, and we must continue to work with member states to reduce
the time it takes for the U.N. to put peacekeepers in the
field." About United Nations PeacekeepingThe United Nations has been involved in peacekeeping activities since 1948, yet the nature of the missions has evolved greatly since then. Traditionally, peacekeeping missions have been limited to observer missions in which peacekeeping soldiers patrol buffer zones between hostile parties, and personnel are deployed only after a cease-fire has been agreed upon. Since the end of the Cold War, UN-led peacekeeping operations have grown in number and in complexity. Today peace operations not only involve military soldiers, but also include civilian police officers, electoral experts, human rights monitors, land mine clearance experts, and civilian communications and governance experts. Duties of peace personnel include maintaining security and ensuring the absence of violence, protecting civilian populations, delivering humanitarian assistance, de-arming, demobilizing, and reintegrating ex-soldiers into civil society, assisting in the fulfillment of components of peace agreements, monitoring and conducting free and fair elections, recruiting for and training local civilian police, monitoring human rights, and conducting investigations into allegations of human rights violations. Peace operations are an attempt by the international community to alleviate situations of massive human suffering. These types of operations are intended to enhance international peace, protect the delivery of humanitarian relief where armed violence has prevented efforts to assist a distressed population, and to establish a visible security to allow people to function without fear of bodily harm. These operations are complex, especially when they take place in areas where parties are particularly hostile to one another. It requires the cooperation and coordination of international and national government and non-governmental organizations (diplomatic, humanitarian, military, and civilian police) and other interested local individuals and groups. UN-led peacekeeping operations are directed by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), but no peace operation is conducted without the collaboration of other international organizations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and non-UN agencies, such as the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), are all usual participants in various aspects of peacekeeping operations. One example of the changing nature of peace operations is the UNTAET mission in East Timor. In August 1999 the people of East Timor overwhelmingly voted for independence from Indonesia. In response, militias who supported a continued union with Indonesia began a deadly wave of violence, looting, and arson. The violence forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes. The United Nations stepped in by authorizing a multinational force, led by Australia (INTERFET), to stop the violence and protect the will of the people. The need for an intervening peacekeeping force was obvious, but the United Nations did not have the necessary capability to enforce peace and prevent violent massacres. Fortunately for the East Timorese, Australia had the capability and political will to step in when this crisis arose. East Timor had almost no governmental institutions, poor roads and communication systems, few schools and medical facilities, little sustainable economic promise, thousands of refugees, and severe ethnic tension and mistrust. Therefore, several months later the UNTAET mission was established under UN Resolution 1272 (1999-present) with a far-reaching mandate, which would oversee the massive humanitarian relief efforts and temporarily administer government functions until East Timor could peacefully and effectively govern itself. The mandate empowers the UN peace force to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor, establish an effective governmental administration, assist in the development of civil and social services (including a human rights observing police force), ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, support capacity-building for self-government, and assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development. The case of East Timor is widely accepted as a success for the United Nations; however, without the efforts of Australia to come in and stop the massacres, the outcome of East Timor could have been very different, which demonstrates the critical need for a standing UN military peacekeeping force. The success of East Timor comes after a long list of widely acknowledged UN-led peacekeeping failures, such as in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. Problems quickly arise when there is an international emergency needing immediate response. The need for rapid deployment became painfully evident after the Rwandan genocide when over 800,000 Tutsis were killed in a period of only six weeks. Because the United Nations does not have a standing military or police force, it depends on the generosity of UN member nations to volunteer military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping missions. Currently the United Nations depends upon a "Stand-by Arrangements System" (UNSAS), which is based on conditional commitments by member states for specific resources. These resources can range from military formations, specialized military and civilian personnel, services, to material and equipment. The resources are on reserve in their home country. When international emergencies erupt the Secretary General must request member states to let the UN use the "stand-by" resources. If participating member states approve the forces are deployed. In the past ten years, the system has usually taken 3-6 months to deploy forces. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan recognized the weaknesses and limitations of peacekeeping operations in today's international atmosphere and commissioned a report by an independent panel of experts on what changes were necessary to make UN peacekeeping operations more effective and efficient and how to implement those changes. The findings and key recommendations were published in what is commonly called the Brahimi Report. Despite the many weaknesses of peace operations, the missions still serve as a vital component of international stability and international world order and deserve to be improved upon. The Failures of the Current Approach to Peace OperationsThe responsibilities of United Nations' peace operations have greatly expanded and become much more complex since the end of the Cold War, yet the resources allocated and the support necessary to satisfy those responsibilities has not expanded with the need. Indeed, in recent years the UN has been forced to work under horrific budget constraints, imposed by misguided legislation foisted on the UN by its largest supporter, the United States. The budget constraints, combined with other systemic shortcomings, have greatly reduced the effectiveness and efficiency of peace operations to staggeringly low levels. The first problem is one of understanding. One of the goals of a peacekeeping operation is to project credible force, so that those who would "spoil" the peace by creating new conflict are constrained. But too often the mandate, the goals, the equipment and the skill level of the troops for the mission are not adequate to the task-they cannot deal with a 'worst-case scenario' situation. Peacekeeping operations of the nineties have often been located in conflict areas where there was a stalemate and where the parties were not necessarily committed to ending the confrontation. If hostile parties are not serious about resolving their conflict without violence and peacekeepers are sent in anyway, but not equipped or mandated properly, the result has often been failure. Such situations may arise when a possible genocide is taking place, such as in Rwanda in early 1994 when UN forces were instructed to withdraw rather than protect those being massacred during the genocide, or when there is a stalemate between warring parties, such as when the UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone were kidnapped and held captive by RUF (Revolutionary United Front) forces because they were not allowed to adequately defend themselves. It also happened in the former Yugoslavia, where UN forces at Srebrenica were helpless to prevent what is believed to be the single largest slaughter of humans since World War II. From these cases and others, the Brahimi Report identified a crucial lesson-the UN cannot always be totally impartial when operating under conditions where conflict still simmers. It must be prepared and ready to respond to violence with sufficient force to protect innocent civilian lives. One of the biggest problems, however, and the most difficult to overcome, is garnering enough political will from member states of the UN to support peace operations. Political will refers to the need for member states to become seriously committed to the objective of ensuring global security and peace in areas of unrest. Without the support of member states, and their recognition that peace operations are a vital responsibility for the UN, those peace operations will ultimately fail. Unfortunately, domestic national interest too often interferes with a coherent approach to UN peace operations, and in so doing ignores the relevance peace operations pose to national security, as well as to the greater humanitarian good. There are fundamental political fissures that allow peace operations to be used as a political tool. The conflict of member states interests (especially within the UN Security Council) has had an enormous impact on the UN in terms of peacekeeping operations. Domestic interests have resulted in the failure of UN peace operations to be fully or correctly mandated, prepared, or able to engage properly in an effective and successful mission. Peacekeeping operations can be hindered in terms of their responsiveness and initiative by strict and narrow mandates dictated by the UN Security Council. The UN and its activities are only a reflection of its member states. Thus, UN peace operations can only progress as far as the member states want and allow them to. The Security Council in the past has drafted and passed broad mandates for peace operations without first accruing sufficient troop and equipment commitments from member states to properly implement the resolution. This often leaves the Secretary General to scramble and in essence 'beg' member states to donate troops and other personnel and equipment. It also ensures that troops arrive in country without being properly equipped and ready to take on their mandate, which creates large logistical problems right from the start of the mission. Currently there are no requirements that the Security Council should create clear and achievable mandates, which would prevent these types of problems. But again, the Brahimi Report has identified the issue of the mandates as critical to the overall success or failure of UN peace operations. Financing is another major problem for peace operations. All member states are obligated to pay their share of peacekeeping costs under a formula that they themselves have agreed upon, but the failure of states to pay their dues fully and on time means that peacekeeping missions are often significantly underfunded. Quite often, the UN is unable to pay troop-contributing nations the agreed-upon rate for their contribution to a mission. This makes it all the more difficult to secure troops for the next mission. Purchases of equipment for rapid deployment of troops for missions are incomplete because of budget troubles. The UN frequently juggles money from one account to another to pay for basic needs such as electricity bills, again because of shortfalls caused by member states failing to pay legally obligated dues. And the U.S. is by far the largest culprit. UN peace operations are currently conducted on an ad hoc basis. The UN does not have a standing military or police force that can be ready to deploy on short notice, which precludes any real type of rapid response. UN peacekeeping forces take months to years to organize, deploy, and effectively establish themselves in the conflict area, which allows further escalation of conflict. For peace operations to be effective, rapid deployment of forces is vital, and is the only way the end result will be saved lives. If the UN had had the ability to deploy forces within thirty days of the realization that genocide was taking place in April 1994, hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Tutsi lives could have been spared. Equipment procurement and storage is another component of peace operations that is severely lacking. When it comes to peace operations, the UN would have the capacity to respond more quickly if standardized equipment was stored and ready to be used on short notice. The Brahimi Report also noted that the vast majority of the time lag problems of peace operations is not the fault of the peacekeepers themselves, but rather actors and causes beyond their control. For peace operations to become more effective, the managerial structure and capacities of the UN and UNDPKO (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations) must be changed. It is simply not possible for a handful of staff at UN headquarters in New York to effectively or properly manage nearly 60,000 personnel in the field, serving in missions throughout the world. UN headquarters lacks necessary flexibility, autonomy, and resources and is often forced to operate without clear mandates, as noted earlier. At the same time, few officials at UN headquarters can be held accountable for the performance of the department. The organizational structure of the DPKO must also be altered. It must have better resources for planning and implementation. The UN lacks the staff necessary to run the basic operations of the DPKO office. Organizational restructuring should also include the latest technology for communication and transportation and the means to gather and analyze information. The DPKO needs the capability to conduct fact-finding missions and gather field intelligence. At this time there is no intelligence and information analysis program for peace operations. As a result, leaders of peacekeeping missions are left without the adequate information necessary to conduct the operation. Effectiveness and efficiency missions could be greatly improved by having an intelligence and information analysis capacity already in place. Often when peace agreements are signed, DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) components are included. The United Nations, the international actor most likely to monitor peace agreement compliance, lacks substantive DDR programs. These programs are also dependent upon having adequate personnel, equipment, and political will to support such operations. The nature of conflicts today is much different than since the end of the Cold War, and therefore the nature of U.N. peace operations is in turn more complex than the "first generation" peace operations. In the past decade the vast majority of deadly conflicts have been internal rather than state vs. state. These conflicts have also primarily involved civilians (as victims, refugees, internally displaced populations, 'freedom fighters', etc.) rather than paid soldiers. The "civilian" components of peace operations have thus become more relevant and prominent. Certain "civilian" components of peace operations include electoral assistance and governance support as part of a broader strategy of international security. Another important civilian component of peace operations includes CIVPOL - the U.N. civilian police. Police inherently are more integrated in with the populace of a society than military soldiers and interact with the people more. There is a growing consensus that the use of CIVPOL to train and recruit local police (to abide by international human rights standards) is a high priority in peace operations. Unfortunately, CIVPOL faces many of the same problems that the military division of peace operations faces. Peace operations have largely been a reaction to an international conflict, rather than a preemptive measure to restrain violent conflict. The only U.N. peace operation not to be "reactive" was in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1995-1999). The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) was a unique operation that monitored border areas for any activity that could undermine confidence and stability. UNPREDEP activities included reporting illegal arms flows, preventing violent clashes, assisted in humanitarian distribution, and provided community services. Because the former Yugoslavia is known for its ethnic tensions and violent outbreaks UNPREDEP took decisive measures to prevent the spread of the violence. Unfortunately, the mission's length-extension was rejected by China's veto and the UNPREDEP force had to withdraw. Not long after, massive waves of violence ensued in Macedonia. The need for serious change is obvious when examining past peacekeeping operations. Current resources will be used inefficiently if there is not adequate reform. Failure in addressing the current problems of peace operations will only result in death and human suffering. The urgency of the need for change is compounded in the light of recent events in Afghanistan and in other conflict ridden areas of the world. Clearly, post-conflict zones that are left unattended can pose serious risks to the national security of nations halfway around the world, as among other things they become breeding grounds for criminal activity and terrorism. These problems cannot be disregarded. The implementation of the recommendations of the Brahimi Report are incredibly important in making U.N. peace operations capable of ensuring peace and security in every corner of the world. The Need for UN Civilian Police CapacityBackground There's a big difference between a soldier armed with an M-16 rifle sitting atop a tank patrolling the streets, and an unarmed international civilian police officer walking the beat with a local police officer, but both are crucial elements of a successful UN peace operation. Soldiers are necessary to stop armed conflict, giving parties the breathing room to start the peace process. United Nations civilian police officers (CIVPOL) help make the peace permanent. Soldiers are trained to fight wars and kill enemies. But once the fighting is stopped, what then? Maintaining public safety is not a job for soldiers, at least not if the goal is to avoid military occupation, and the last thing anyone wants is a peace operation that resembles a military occupation. The whole point of a UN peace operation is to put a country that has been torn apart by violent conflict back on its feet, giving its population the opportunity to develop economically and politically with full participation from all sectors of society. Consequently, the goal in any peace operation is to withdraw military peacekeepers as soon as possible, once a secure environment has been created. The UN and the international community have learned that when this happens, though, the job is not done. A secure environment is not enough; the rule of law must be restored as well, or mission failure will likely occur. Accordingly, the UN now deploys a CIVPOL component in most peace operations to begin a process of rebuilding the structures of law and order in a post-conflict society. UN CIVPOL perform many different functions in UN peace operations, depending on the situation and the Security Council mandate. Examples range from human rights monitoring to helping establish, train and equip local police forces. In Kosovo, for the first time CIVPOL officers were given full executive law enforcement authority, meaning they were armed and could serve warrants and arrest citizens. Similarly, in East Timor, CIVPOL officers helped maintain law and order while conducting training programs for the creation of a local police force. Restoring the rule of law requires more than just police, however. Correctional staff are needed to oversee jails and ensure that civil rights are observed. Judicial support staff and judges are needed to process criminals fairly, with respect to due process and other rights. Amazingly, though, the UN does not have a system in place to secure civilian police and related personnel for UN peace operations. The existing system is entirely ad-hoc! This creates a real problem. For example, when NATO soldiers first arrived in Kosovo, little could be done to address rampant criminal activity and ethnic violence. Eventually, given the slow response by member states to the UN's request for civilian police, NATO soldiers began arresting criminals. But with no jails to hold them, and no judges to try them, most were released. Kosovo highlighted the fundamental problem the UN faces-it has no good way of quickly securing and deploying civilian police, and this has an adverse effect on post-conflict reconstruction efforts. When a country sends soldiers to a UN peace operation, they come from the barracks, where they are ready to deploy when needed. But where are the police officers that the UN needs? They are on duty on the streets of our cities and towns, patrolling and investigating crimes. Every civilian police officer serving in a UN peace operation, therefore, is one absent from his or her hometown. It takes months for the UN to acquire civilian police officers each time it needs them. Furthermore, the police sent to the UN are often poorly trained and consequently their behavior is often unprofessional and sometimes even illegal. The UN civilian police system needs fixing. Logically, this will require a permanent professional UN police corps that meets high standards of training. This is the only way to avoid pulling local police officers from their hometowns while still meeting a critical national security priority. A UN civilian police corps will keep U.S. soldiers from being needlessly deployed longer than necessary, will keep U.S. police officers at home patrolling their own streets, and will advance U.S. national security interests. Best of all, this will ensure that police officers in UN peace operations are held accountable for their actions and that their behavior will be professional and appropriate. Making the Case for a United Nations Civilian Police Corps (UNCPC)
The UNCPC fills a massive gap in capacity in international peace operations. At present, the full deployment of the mandated strength of civilian police to an international peace operation can take months or years to accomplish, if ever. The current system in place at the UN to recruit and deploy civilian police is largely ad-hoc. More importantly, police officers are on duty on the streets of member states, not waiting in barracks for the call to arms. It is difficult to recruit civilian police for peace operations because national governments generally need their police where they are-protecting their citizens. The UN Civ-Pol Corps can fill this gap, and prevent governments from having to choose between pressing local needs and pressing national security needs.
The UNCPC addresses and resolves serious issues regarding accountability and the inappropriate behavior of civilian police in peace operations. Another problem with the current UN civilian police recruitment efforts is the quality and behavior of the police sent to serve in UN peace operations. There have been problems in many peace operations, involving activities such as arms smuggling, drug smuggling, and sexual trafficking. In 2002, the U.S. Congress held hearings to address problems with UN Civilian Police in Bosnia (primarily involving U.S. police officers hired by DynCorp, an American firm contracted by the State Department to provide the U.S. civilian police contribution to the UN). Several police officers were found to be running a sex slave ring, involving women and underage girls. News stories allege these problems are found in other peace operations. By creating a professional, trained, and certified police corps at the UN, the UNCPC bill takes steps to alleviate this problem. The UN no longer has to accept sub-standard police for peace operations, and instead has a competent and professional force available for quick deployment.
The UNCPC fills a serious National Security gap. Failed states are more than just human disaster areas-they can easily become safe havens of operation for organized criminal networks and international terrorist organizations. The destruction of the Twin Towers is a testament to the ability of such networks to impact national security. A key way to stop these networks in post-conflict states is by restoring the rule of law. This requires that many things be done-first stop the armed conflict, which is done by military forces, and then getting police, courts and jails to function properly. Once people feel safe going to school or work, and once those who break the law are dealt with by courts that respect human rights, and are held in jails where they are not tortured or killed, than a society can begin to heal itself.
The UN Civ-Pol Corps is a key tool in preventing the unnecessary deployment of military soldiers for civilian purposes. A problem often cited by military commanders when discussing peacekeeping missions is how often soldiers end up doing jobs they were not trained for and should not be doing. A common complaint of Congress and administration officials is that the military should not get bogged down in non-war tasks. Yet the military itself acknowledges that restoring the rule of law is a necessity in any peace operation, and if no one else will do it, they will. The UN Civ-Pol Corps can prevent the use of military forces for non-military tasks, freeing them for other duties or arenas.
The UN Civ-Pol Corps makes sense, because it is 'doable'. Aside from any political issues surrounding the creation of a military force at the UN, such a force would require significantly enhanced logistical, intelligence, and command capacities, which would add hugely to the cost of such a force. The Civ-Pol Corps is cheap. It would only require that minimal additional support capacities be created at the UN.
The UNCPC would not be used in any sort of initial peacekeeping intervention. It would not fight its way into ongoing conflicts, because it could not-it will not be a military force. The UNCPC would be comprised of police officers, not soldiers. American citizens support the UN and International Peacekeeping
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